Employees have the benefit of a whole set of laws designed to protect them in the workplace. But what happens when an employer tells a worker that they are an independent contractor, or simply gives that worker a 1099? What you as a worker need to know is that whether you are an employee or an independent contractor doesn’t necessarily depend on what the employer says—it depends on the nature of the work you do.
Earlier this month, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC), heard oral arguments for Mark A. Adams v. Schneider Electric USA, Inc., an age discrimination lawsuit in which Monica Shah and I filed an amicus brief in support of Adams, on behalf of the Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association.
The Facts
Adams worked as an electrical engineer at Schneider Electric in Andover, Massachusetts from 2007 to 2017. On January 27, 2017, as part of a reduction-in-force (RIF), Schneider Electric laid off Adams, who was 54 years old at the time. As part of this RIF, Schneider Electric laid off seven other employees, all of whom were over 55 years old. There were two other RIFs at Schneider Electric within a year of Adams’ termination and of the 24 employees laid off, 23 of them were 44 years or older. Adams had strong performance reviews throughout his employment with Schneider Electric and when one of his direct supervisors discovered he was terminated, the supervisor asked for Schneider Electric to bring Adams back because Adams’ absence threatened the success of one of the supervisor’s projects; Schneider Electric declined to re-hire Adams. While Schneider Electric maintains that Adams’ termination of employment had nothing to do with his age and the person who fired Adams acted alone without influence from others at the company, Adams argues that there are several factors surrounding his termination that suggest he was discriminated against because of his age, including a Human Resources employee instructing the decision-maker who fired Adams to consider age when selecting candidates to terminate for the RIF. In addition, there was voluminous e-mail documentation between Schneider Electric employees discussing restructuring tactics that included letting go of older employees to make room for a younger workforce.
In the summer of 2020, the United States was experiencing both the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic and nation-wide outrage over the police killing of George Floyd. Employees at Whole Foods grocery stores around the country—some Black, some not—began wearing face masks promoting the Black Lives Matter movement. Whole Foods management responded by reprimanding these employees for violating a dress code policy against clothing with messages or logos, even though the policy had never been consistently enforced in the past. Employees who insisted on wearing the masks were sent home. Eventually, some employees were fired.
One employee who was fired was Savannah Kinzer, who worked at the River Street Whole Foods store in Cambridge. In July 2020, Kinzer and others from around the country sued Whole Foods in a Massachusetts federal court, alleging racial discrimination and illegal retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. On January 23, 2023, Kinzer suffered a defeat when District Court Judge Allison Burroughs, an Obama appointee, granted a motion by Whole Foods for summary judgement. Despite the disappointing outcome, the litigation so far has also prompted positive developments with respect to associational discrimination claims in the First Circuit.
Phases of the Case
This week, President Biden signed the Speak Out Act into law, the most recent victory for advocates against workplace sexual assault and sexual harassment. The Speak Out Act makes prior non-disclosure and non-disparagement clauses in agreements (or “NDAs”) unenforceable when the parties
later become engaged in a dispute regarding sexual assault or sexual harassment.
The first substantive section of the Speak Out Act lays out a series of findings regarding sexual assault and sexual harassment that paint a clear picture of the need for the law. As stated by the Act, “eighty-one percent of women and forty-three percent of men have experienced some form of sexual assault or harassment throughout their lifetime,” and “one in three women has faced sexual harassment in the workplace during her career.” Despite these staggering statistics, “an estimated 87 to 94 percent of those who experience sexual harassment never file a formal complaint.” CONTINUE READING ›
We have previously written about how Massachusetts law limits non-competition clauses. Non-competition clauses restrict where an employee can work after she leaves a job; an employee agrees in a contract not to work for a competitor for a period of time after she separates from an employer. Under M.G.L. c. 149 § 24L, non-compete agreements signed as a condition of employment must meet certain requirements, including advance notice of the clause, compensation in exchange for accepting the limitation, and the opportunity to consult with counsel. The law also requires that non-competes have a limited duration and scope. Clauses signed after October 2018 must comply with the statute to be enforceable.
But there are other kinds of restrictions that are like non-competes that are not subject to the statute’s requirements. Principal among those are non-solicitation agreements. Non-solicitation clauses restrict who an employee can contact after they leave a job. Non-solicitation clauses can prohibit people from recruiting employees at the prior employer. Clauses can prohibit reaching out to, or doing business with, any customers of the prior employer. Sometimes they are written so broadly that a clause tries to prohibit an employee from even speaking with a former customer or co-worker. Thus, employers sometimes try to use non-solicitation agreements to accomplish what they no longer can through a non-compete clause: The clauses are broad and unlimited; they can be so restrictive about what communications an employee may have, that, in practice, the employee cannot conduct business. Imagine, for example, a seasoned salesperson with a large existent network of customers. As a practical matter, a non-solicitation agreement might bar her from talking to most potential customers in her industry should she leave a job, preventing her from performing any new job she should get that involves sales.
Courts, however, have held overly broad non-solicitation agreements unenforceable. Thus, even absent the protection of a statute, the law still places restrictions on a company to limit a former employee’s communications with former colleagues and customers. A judge in the Massachusetts Superior Court recently noted that non-solicitation agreements “limit competition in a market to sell goods or services to potential customers.” As the Appeals Court has held, a non-solicitation agreement can only be enforced under Massachusetts law to the extent “necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate business interests” and “and only to the extent that it is reasonable in time and space, necessary to protect legitimate interests, and not an obstruction of the public interest.” That means, for example, that a non-solicitation clause that does not have any relationship to protecting an employer’s confidential information, intellectual property, or trade secrets is likely unenforceable. A non-solicitation agreement that is not limited in time or geography is also likely unenforceable.
In the last few decades, and particularly since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, remote working arrangements have become increasingly common. In many industries, an employee can produce documents, answer emails, and attend video meetings from anywhere with an Internet connection, without even setting foot in an employer’s office. That flexibility, however, can create complications for the employment relationship, particularly when there is a question about which state’s laws apply. Since Massachusetts laws are often more favorable to employees than those of other states, we regularly field questions from workers wondering whether they can enforce their rights under Massachusetts law even if they do not live, or regularly work, in Massachusetts.
Unfortunately, there is not one clear answer that applies to all laws or all situations. For the most part, a court will look at the details of an employment relationship to decide whether Massachusetts is the core of the relationship or has significant connections to what the employee was doing. The physical place that work takes place is relevant but not always dispositive. CONTINUE READING ›
If you are an at-will employee, you have the right to quit your job at any time. And there may be compelling reasons to leave immediately. But quitting your job will affect your legal rights, so before you resign, here are some things to consider.
Can I collect unemployment?
You may not be able to collect unemployment if you quit. In Massachusetts, if you choose to resign, you will not be eligible for unemployment unless you show that you left (a) for good cause attributable to your employer; or (b) for urgent and compelling personal reasons. When you quit, the burden will be on you to show that you should receive unemployment. CONTINUE READING ›
Earlier this month, the Massachusetts Appeals Court limited protections available to public employees in Harrison vs. MBTA, holding that sovereign immunity protects public employers from claims brought under the employee misclassification and anti-retaliation provisions of G.L. c. 149.
In general, sovereign immunity is a legal doctrine that protects a government from being sued. The Massachusetts government, like most governments, has created certain exceptions to the doctrine, so that the state can be sued under limited circumstances. Unfortunately, as decided in Harrison, employee misclassification and wage-based retaliation do not qualify.
Background of the Case
Harrison involves two workers who performed IT services for the MBTA pursuant to contracts between the MBTA and other merchants. The workers alleged that they were misclassified as independent contractors rather than employees, which disqualifies them from certain legal protections, and one of them alleged that he was fired in retaliation after asserting that he was misclassified.
Both claims – misclassification and retaliation – arise under the Massachusetts Wage Act, G.L. c. 149, §148 et seq. Before reaching the question of whether the workers were misclassified or retaliated against, though, the court had to decide whether sovereign immunity allowed the suits to be brought against the MBTA. CONTINUE READING ›
What Teachers and Other School Employees Need to Know About Title IX
While many people think of Title IX as a law that applies only to students, in fact the law does not mention students at all. The language of the statute is: “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Professors, teachers, and other employees of educational programs are protected by Title IX, and also have obligations under Title IX not to engage in actions that constitute sex-based discrimination or harassment.
Title IX Protects Employees from Discrimination and Harassment
As I have previously discussed, Title IX protects school employees from gender-based harassment or discrimination. The current federal regulations implementing Title IX make explicit that Title IX prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sex, stating “A recipient shall make all employment decisions in any education program or activity operated by such recipient in a nondiscriminatory manner.” While there has been some disagreement among different federal courts about whether employees can bring Title IX claims if they also have claims under Title VII (the federal law prohibiting discrimination in employment more generally), the majority of appeals courts have found that employees can bring claims under both laws. The Department of Justice’s Title IX Legal Manual makes clear that that Department agrees with the circuits that have found that employees can pursue both Title IX and Title VII claims: “The Department takes the position that Title IX and Title VII are separate enforcement mechanisms. Individuals can use both statutes to attack the same violations.” Here in Massachusetts, both the First Circuit, in a case from 1988, and a judge in the District of Massachusetts in a case last year, have held that Title IX claims are not preempted by Title VII claims, and school employees can pursue both claims simultaneously. CONTINUE READING ›
The SJC struck an initiative from November’s ballot that, if approved, would have created a new class of “app-based driver” not subject to many bedrock employment laws. In Koussa v. Attorney General, the Court held that the proposed initiative raised too many different policy questions, and, thus, did not meet constitutional requirements for petitions. Because Massachusetts law only allows ballot initiatives that present voters with “related” and “mutually dependent” issues, the Court held that the Attorney General should not have allowed the initiative onto the ballot. CONTINUE READING ›
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