Former California Congresswoman Katie Hill recently resigned after sexually explicit photos of Hill and a staffer engaged in consensual sexual activity were leaked, allegedly by her abusive ex-husband. Her resignation should trigger broader discussions about the consequences of living in a digital age: how do we view and treat victims and perpetrators of “revenge porn”? What legal rights are there for people whose sexual privacy has been invaded, and what legal consequences are there for those who access and distribute such material? It turns out that Massachusetts is one of the last states to take up this question at the legislative level.
In Doe v. Trustees of Boston College, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit refused to extend due process protections to private Massachusetts colleges, despite its recent holding in Haidak v. UMass-Amherst that some form of cross-examination or equivalent questioning is required at public universities. It therefore reversed a District Court decision that would have required some form of real-time questioning on issue of credibility. In so doing, the First Circuit deferred to state courts and the state legislature to define the contours of the “basic fairness” requirements for private schools under state law (having ducked the issue in a previous decision in a different Boston College case). This narrow holding underscores the need for further development of state law governing student discipline in light of significant developments in law and practice around the country since the Massachusetts appellate courts last weighed in more than 10 years ago.
Last month, the Supreme Judicial Court issued Commonwealth v. Matta, a case that makes it easier for police to stop individuals – especially those in high crime neighborhoods – without any reasonable suspicion.
On the evening of November 5, 2015, an anonymous caller contacted police on two occasions and stated that they had seen someone put a gun under the front seat of black car with two male and two female occupants. The caller claimed that the car was parked in the city of Holyoke in an area described as “known for violent crime, drug sales, and shootings.” An officer who was dispatched to the scene saw a parked green car with only two passengers. The officer pulled up behind the green car and parked, without lights or a siren. As the officer exited his vehicle, he observed the defendant, who had been seated in the passenger seat, exit the car and adjust his waistband with both hands. The defendant then began walking toward nearby bushes away from the sidewalk. The officer called out to him, “Hey, come here for a second.” The defendant then made eye contact with the officer and started to run, holding onto his waistband as he ran. At this point the officer yelled at the defendant to stop and then ran after him. As the defendant was running, the officer observed him throw a plastic bag over a fence and onto a sidewalk. Several officers apprehended the defendant as he tried to climb the fence, and once they arrested him, the officers saw six wax baggies at his feet and found small wax baggies on the other side of the fence, totaling 129 baggies that were later determined to contain heroin.
If the volume of calls to our office is any indication, the Boston Public School (BPS) system is stepping up enforcement of its residency policies. It is not surprising that with national attention on the “Varsity Blues” scandal (involving prosecutions of celebrities who fraudulently secured their children’s acceptance to college), and increasing criticism of the lack of diversity at Boston’s elite exam schools, BPS would be looking to crack down on students falsely claiming to live in Boston in order to attend Boston schools. But parents and students have a right to understand and contests BPS’s findings in these investigations: Fifteen years ago a Massachusetts court made clear to BPS that before it could declare a student a non-resident and remove him or her from the BPS system, it had to provide the student’s family basic due process protections. Unfortunately it appears that BPS continues to ignore this court decision and families’ rights in pursuing residency enforcement actions.
Massachusetts General Laws chapter 76, § 5 states “Every person shall have a right to attend the public schools of the town where he actually resides.” The law seems clear enough, but of course the devil is in the details: what does it mean to reside in Boston? This is a question our courts have answered: in most cases, the minor student “resides” where the parent(s) who has (or have) physical custody resides. The BPS Superintendent’s Office has issued a policy further explaining what it views this statute to require, and how BPS will determine residency. Following Massachusetts court cases that have defined residency, the policy defines “residence” as “the place that is the center of [the student’s and/or parent’s] domestic, social, and civic life.” The focus of “residency” is therefore not only whether the student has a physical address in Boston, though of course that is relevant, but on where the center of the student’s life is. This focus indicates that where questions about residency arise, BPS must conduct a holistic evaluation that takes into account non-traditional family and education arrangements.
This week the Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) decided Commonwealth v. Newberry, in which it held that judges must arraign defendants prior to assigning them to pretrial diversion if the Commonwealth seeks arraignment. In my opinion the decision is wrong on the law, and eliminates an essential avenue for some defendants to avoid the negative consequences of a criminal charge on their records.
Under the law in question, the court may “at arraignment” delay the case for two weeks for assessment of the defendant’s suitability for diversion to a treatment or other program in lieu of prosecution. (The “program” in question can include community service, so diversion is a possibility even for those not in need of, for example, mental health or substance abuse treatment.) At the two-week return date, the court may, if it determines that the defendant is eligible for diversion, continue the case for 90 days to allow the defendant to complete the program, and then dismiss it following that period. The question in this case was whether the defendant must be arraigned before the case is diverted, if the Commonwealth so requests. Before the decision certainly many judges believed that they had authority to divert cases pre-arraignment even if the prosecution objected, and our office secured this disposition for a number of defendants. For example, in January 2019 I convinced a judge to grant a client pre-arraignment diversion on condition that he complete an anger management course and community service, over the objection of the Commonwealth.
This case will change the availability of that option. The SJC read the language in the statute stating that these events must take place “at arraignment” to mean that they cannot happen pre-arraignment if the prosecution objects. To my mind this reading is not at all mandated by the plain language of the statute. I would read the language “at arraignment” to indicate only that the determination should be made at the defendant’s first appearance before the court, i.e. their scheduled arraignment. The statute does not use language such as “after arraignment,” which would clearly indicate that defendants must actually be arraigned before diversion, or directly address whether diversion can take place prior to arraignment. And it nowhere gives the prosecution authority to stand in the way of diversion if the court finds it to be warranted, so it is bizarre that the court’s statutory reading gives prosecutors the discretion whether or not to demand arraignment in a particular case.
The grand jury is a centuries-old institution, dating back at least to the Magna Carta in England, and enshrined in both state and federal constitutions in this country. In order to charge someone with a felony, a prosecutor must present sufficient evidence to a group of ordinary citizens to establish probable cause that the defendant committed the crime. The grand jury is both an investigative body – the grand jury has the power to issue subpoenas, typically at the prosecutor’s suggestion – and a check on the authority of the prosecutor. The felony prosecution cannot proceed if the grand jurors vote a “no bill” and refuse to indict.
Whether you are heading off to your first year of college, or are returning for your fourth (or sixth, or ninth) year of higher education, you are likely aware that sexual assault prevention is a big issue on college and university campuses today. We represent students—both those who have experienced sexual assault or misconduct and those accused of sexual misconduct—in campus proceedings at colleges and universities around the country. Here is some information that all students should know before heading back to campus.
What is Title IX, and What Does It Mean for my School?
Title IX is the federal law that prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in education. In addition to ensuring that there are equal athletic and educational opportunities for all students, it also requires schools to address and take steps to prevent sex-based discrimination on campus, including sexual harassment and sexual assault. If a school knows of sex-based discrimination on campus and does not adequately respond to it, a court may find the school has violated Title IX.
In practice, what that means for your school is that it is obligated to address complaints of sexual harassment, dating violence, and sexual assault if it learns of them. Almost every school has set up a Title IX office solely to address these kinds of complaints. The job of this office is to resolve those complaints – which often but not always entails a disciplinary process against the accused student.
In April, six women filed a proposed class-action gender discrimination, sexual harassment, and pregnancy discrimination lawsuit in federal court in D.C. against international law firm Jones Day, with four of the women proceeding under the pseudonyms “Jane Doe 1-4.” The court initially allowed this, stating “Plaintiffs’ significant interest in maintaining their anonymity at this stage of the litigation is sufficient to overcome any general presumption in favor of open proceedings.” Jones Day vigorously contested this move, arguing that by allowing the women to proceed under pseudonym, the court was giving credence to the women’s argument that Jones Day would retaliate against them if their identities were public, that it prevents the public from assessing the claims, and that because the plaintiffs courted publicity, proceeding under pseudonym was inappropriate. Jones Day also argued that it could not investigate the women’s claims without knowing their identities. In similar gender, pregnancy, and family responsibility discrimination cases filed against Jones Day in 2018 and just this month, the plaintiffs chose to proceed under their own names. Over the course of the litigation, all but one of the anonymous plaintiffs chose to reveal their identities. On August 7, 2019, the judge presiding over the case issued a sealed order requiring the last remaining anonymous plaintiff to reveal her identity. In lieu of revealing her identity, Jane Doe 4 left the lawsuit.
On August 21, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit released a decision that reaffirms that a hostile work environment claim can span many years, so long as some of the acts that are part of the broader pattern of harassment occurred within the statute of limitations period. In Nieves Borges v. El Conquistador Partnership, the First Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment for a defendant, holding that the district court erred in excluding past evidence of sexual harassment in evaluating the plaintiff’s. The Court emphasized that “so long as one instance of harassment falls within the statutory limitations period,” “the entire period of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for the purposes of determining liability.” In other words, past conduct is part of the broader pattern of harassment at issue and is therefore relevant to assessing the nature of an employer’s bad behavior.
The plaintiff in Nieves Borges took a long time to report the harassment he faced. This is, of course, not unusual in employment discrimination cases in which a worker who experience sexual or other types of harassment fears losing his or her job. The plaintiff had worked at his company as a food service manager for twenty-two years when he was terminated in July of 2015. During that time, a high level manager (the Director of Human Resources) had harassed the plaintiff for more than a decade: According to the plaintiff that harassment included unwanted touching and frequent episodes in which the manager would look the plaintiff up and down while pressuring him to go out for drinks. In 2007, the alleged harasser went so far as to proposition the plaintiff over lunch. After that time, the alleged harasser bothered the plaintiff intermittently, even asking him to socialize several times in 2014, but never propositioned him again. But the plaintiff did not report his supervisor’s behavior until 2014, years after the pattern began and well after the most severe incident. At summary judgment, the district court refused to consider the older incidents, because none of the acts that occurred after 2014 rose to the level of sexual harassment. The district court also held that to prove his claim that he was subjected to a hostile environment the plaintiff had to demonstrate that the conduct he faced was both severe and pervasive.
Last week the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit released its second decision in the last few years addressing campus sexual misconduct disciplinary proceedings. In Haidak v. University of Massachusetts-Amherst, the First Circuit largely found for the University, concluding, as my colleague recently discussed, that the procedures it applied in Mr. Haidak’s case were sufficient to pass constitutional muster.
In writing about these campus disciplinary proceedings, the court glossed over the factual realities of these cases and made some concerning statements that—if schools were to adopt them as policy—would undermine students’ rights.