Supreme Judicial Court confirms individuals may be sued for sexual harassment in education settings under state statute

In a decision issued this week, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) held that victims of sexual harassment in academic settings may sue individual harassers directly under G.L. c. 214, § 1C—the state’s sexual harassment statute. The ruling reverses a lower court decision that had dismissed a sexual harassment claim filed by Dr. Kristin Knouse against her former instructor, dissertation committee member, and fellowship director, Dr. David Sabatini. The new ruling clarifies that students and trainees have a statutory right to be free from sexual harassment during their education and may sue individual teachers, faculty, staff, or other students to enforce that right. Naomi Shatz and I filed an amicus brief in the case on behalf of Jane Doe Inc., the Victim Rights Law Center, the Women’s Bar Association of Massachusetts, and the Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association, urging the SJC to find that the statute allows for suits against individuals.  

Background  

The underlying dispute arose between Sabatini, a prominent biologist formerly at the Whitehead Institute and MIT, and Knouse, a former graduate student at MIT and later a Whitehead Fellow. Knouse alleged in internal reports to Whitehead that Sabatini engaged in sexualized comments while he was her instructor and a member of her dissertation committee, that they later had a sexual relationship while he had power over her career, and that Sabatini’s inappropriate conduct continued even after the relationship ended. An internal survey and independent investigation found that engaging in sexual discussions was a requirement for success in Sabatini’s lab and that the lab was dominated by a “culture of fear and retaliation.” When the independent investigation found violations of Whitehead’s sexual harassment policy, Sabatini separated from both Whitehead and MIT. 

Sabatini then sued Knouse and others for defamation and related claims. Knouse countersued, including a sexual harassment claim under G.L. c. 214, § 1C. Sabatini moved to dismiss that claim, arguing that the statute did not allow suits against individuals. Both the Superior Court and the Appeals Court agreed, holding that only institutions could be sued under G.L. c. 214, § 1C. Both courts reasoned that because § 1C incorporates the definition of sexual harassment from the Fair Educational Practices law, G. L. c. 151C, it also incorporates other provisions from c. 151C, including the section limiting that law to prohibiting sexual harassment by an educational institution. 

The SJC Decision  

At the SJC, Knouse argued that nothing in the plain language of G. L. c. 214, § 1C or its legislative history indicated that the Legislature intended to exempt individuals from liability and that, as a civil right law, the sexual harassment statute must be read broadly. Our amicus brief further argued that individual liability is necessary to address the harm of sexual harassment in the educational context, which is not adequately addressed by other remedies. Sexual harassment in education can be particularly prevalent because of the power supervisors, professors, and others in positions of authority have over students, and causes a unique type of harm to those who experience it (through harm to their education and career) that cannot always be remedied through a tort claim or other cause of action.  

The SJC agreed that nothing in G. L. c. 214, § 1C, limits liability to institutions, and rejected Sabatini’s argument that Chapter 151C’s institutional liability provision created a limitation on G. L. c. 214, § 1C. The Court noted that § 1C incorporates only the definition of sexual harassment from Chapter 151C, not its liability provisions. The Court reiterated that civil rights statutes are to be construed liberally to effectuate their purpose, and that reading in a limitation that shields individual harassers would contradict that purpose. Importantly for students who experience sexual harassment, G.L. c. 214, § 1C, allows successful plaintiffs to recover attorney’s fees and costs from the defendant, a provision common to civil rights statutes that helps ensure that there will be lawyers who will bring these cases.   

Notably, the decision is not limited to situations where the harassment is perpetrated by a professor or other person with authority over the student. The Court’s reasoning is equally applicable to situations in which students are sexually harassed by other students or employees of the educational institution. Nor is G.L. c. 214, § 1C, limited to higher education; it applies equally to sexual harassment that occurs in primary and secondary schools, both public and private. 

Conclusion  

The SJC’s decision confirms that G. L. c. 214, § 1C, was enacted as part of a comprehensive statutory scheme to address the problem of sexual harassment in the employment and academic contexts. It was designed to fill a gap in the law by providing a remedy to victims who are not otherwise covered by Chapters 151B (relating to employment) and 151C, and provides broad protection against sexual harassment to students in all educational institutions in the Commonwealth. 

The decision is significant for all students, but particularly graduate students, postdocs, fellows, and other early-career trainees who work in environments where they depend heavily on supervisors and mentors for career advancement. The prospect of individual liability may go some way toward deterring harassment by professors in those settings.  

If you or your child has experienced sexual harassment in an educational setting please fill out our contact form to speak with one of our education lawyers. 

* Our blogs are written by the firm’s attorneys, without the use of AI or ghostwriters