Appeals Court Answers Key Questions About Recent Expansion of Abuse Prevention Orders

In 2024, the Massachusetts legislature enacted a bill that permitted a person suffering from “coercive control” to seek an abuse prevention order. Now, individuals can seek abuse prevention orders against family or household members who direct toward them “a pattern of behavior intended to threaten, intimidate, harass, isolate, control, coerce or compel compliance . . . that causes [them] to reasonably fear physical harm or have a reduced sense of physical safety or autonomy.” Under this definition, the law provides a non-exhaustive list of nine examples of coercive control.

At the time of enactment, we described this bill as “well-intentioned” but “likely to create confusion in the courts.” Recently, the Appeals Court released its first published opinion—Kehlani K. v. Tripp T—interpreting the “coercive control” standard. While this decision provides important clarity, critical questions remain and will require input by the Supreme Judicial Court to resolve.

The Case

This case presents a fairly typical example of an abuse prevention order proceeding.

The abuse prevention order process begins when the plaintiff goes to their local District Court to seek that order. At the Court, the plaintiff can seek an “ex parte” abuse prevention order, which a judge may grant immediately if they find that the plaintiff “demonstrates a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of abuse.” These are temporary orders that a plaintiff (here, Kehlani) can obtain without prior notice to the defendant (here, Tripp). In this case, the plaintiff went to her local District Court in October 2024, and, that day, was granted an ex parte order.

When a judge grants an ex parte order, they must schedule a two-party hearing and promptly notify the defendant that they can defend themselves at that hearing. These hearings must occur within ten business days of the grant of the ex parte order. At the two-party hearing, the judge will decide whether to issue a longer abuse protection order.

In this case, both the plaintiff and defendant testified at the two-party hearing. They were questioned by the judge and by the defendant’s attorney. They testified that they had been married for seventeen years, but in recent years, they had been in divorce proceedings initiated by the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s position was that she was “emotionally done” with the marriage but the defendant was “not letting go.” She testified that even though the defendant had moved out of the marital home, he continued to appear there without permission, block her car in the driveway, and circle the house on foot. She also stated that this activity extended outside the home, where the defendant would appear without permission and without notice at their children’s school pick up, youth sports events, and family vacations. For the defendant’s part, he denied that he went to the plaintiff’s home for reasons other than seeing their children, and he asserted that he appeared at the home at his children’s request.

The judge concluded that the plaintiff had met her burden of demonstrating “coercive control,” and extended the abuse prevention order for one year—a typical extension period for an abuse prevention order granted for the first time. The defendant appealed that decision, and the Appeals Court affirmed the District Court’s grant of the abuse prevention order.

Questions Answered

Writing when the coercive control standard was enacted in 2024, my colleague David Russcol identified various ambiguities in the law. Now, the Appeals Court has provided some answers.

One core ambiguity in the law is that the standard allows judges to issue abuse prevention orders where the plaintiff shows “a reduced sense of physical safety or autonomy.” However, the law does little to define this phrase.

In this case, the Appeals Court stated that the plaintiff’s evidence was sufficient to illustrate a “reduced sense of physical safety” under the statute. The Court highlighted that the defendant’s alleged stalking behaviors—breaking into the marital home through a window, blocking the plaintiff’s car into the driveway, and tracking the plaintiff to different family events—could prove a “reduced sense of physical safety.” Though this answer provides a guidepost as to the type of behavior that clearly satisfies the physical safety standard, the Court declined to provide a precise definition for the standard itself.

The Court also provided clarity on the term “autonomy.” It stated that in the coercive control context, “autonomy” relates to “an individual’s ability to make significant decisions unfettered by concerns that doing so will expose that person to abuse.” In essence, the Court limited claims of reduced autonomy to instances where a plaintiff can show that their exercise of independent decision-making would cause them to suffer abuse (i.e., physical harm, fear of imminent physical harm, or involuntary sexual relations) by the defendant.

In our prior post on this law, we identified several possible unintended consequences of the coercive control standard. The Appeals Court provided clarity on these scenarios, limiting potentially absurd results that could have occurred under the law’s plain text.

One serious scenario we identified arises out of a deteriorating relationship. In this hypothetical, a person encourages their struggling spouse to seek help for their substance abuse problem through a series of ultimatums – “Get help, or I move out.” That struggling spouse, under the plain text of the law, could say that they have a “reduced sense of . . . autonomy” and are suffering from coercive control.

The Appeals Court’s interpretation limits the possibility of this outlandish result. For a plaintiff to argue that they are experiencing a “reduced sense of . . . autonomy,” they must show that their autonomy is being limited by a threat of abuse. In this scenario, as long as the spouse giving the ultimatum is not pairing that ultimatum with a threat of abuse (i.e., “Get help, or I will hurt you”), then it is unlikely under this interpretation that the struggling spouse can obtain an abuse prevention order.

We previously raised questions about how this standard could impact the parent-child relationship:

If Mom says that a certain group of friends are bad news and the child cannot hang out with them anymore, is she “isolating [them] from friends?” If Dad punishes a disobedient child by taking away their phone, is he “controlling, regulating or monitoring [their] activities [or] communications?” If parents tell their children that they have to take turns doing chores every week, is that a pattern of behavior intended to “compel compliance” that limits the children’s “sense of autonomy?”

Though the Appeals Court did not answer these questions squarely, its opinion in this case provides a strong indication that it would answer “no” to each of them. This is because of how the Court defined a “reduced sense of . . . autonomy,” which is necessary under the statute for any child to assert they have experienced coercive control. As discussed above, claims relating to reduced autonomy can only be the basis for an abuse prevention order if that lack of autonomy is connected to a threat of abuse. So, unless the parents express an intent to enforce their rules with corporal punishment, this type of parental decisionmaking likely does not constitute “coercive control.”

Questions Remain

Unfortunately, the Court did not address every ambiguity in the coercive control standard. Perhaps our largest concern was whether speech alone can now be considered “abuse,” which would raise significant constitutional issues. In a footnote in Kehlani K., the Appeals Court stated explicitly that it was avoiding this question and noted that the Supreme Judicial Court is addressing this issue in an upcoming case. When the Supreme Judicial Court weighs in, we will likely have more clarity. Until then, significant questions remain around this new basis for abuse prevention orders.

If you have experienced abuse or need assistance seeking or contesting a restraining order, contact  our employment attorneys at (617) 742-6020.